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Abstract: Positivists have been unsuccessful in fi nding laws in society and most post-
-positivists have little to say about causation. Critical Realism (CR) can help to over-
come these kinds of aporias of social science by providing better understandings for in-
stance about emergence, open-systemic causation and the role of critical reason in hu-
man sciences. However, due to both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, the promises of CR 
have been only partially fulfi lled. In this paper I argue that CR should be redefi ned as 
an open-ended process synthesising scientifi c realism and critical theories with the pur-
pose of advancing our collective learning and development. Concepts such as emergence,
causation and normativity are best understood as open sites of discussions and deve-
lopments, neither originating nor ending in the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar or anyone 
else. Th us understood, CR can provide a plausible, rationally evolving framework for po-
litics, political economy and other social sciences.
Keywords: critique, emancipation, emergence, law, ontology, open system, rationality, re-
lativism
Introduction
Richard Feynman, a famous theoretical physicist, said in an interview in 1981 
that “social science is an example of a science which is not a science […t]hey fol-
low the forms […] but they don’t get any laws”.2 In Feynman’s terms, little pro-
gress has been made since then (for a discussion, see Beed, Beed, 2000). A theo-
retical physicist such as Feynman may think that this is because social scientists 
do not control their experiments or data carefully enough, but there is a much 
1 Thanks are due to Tuomas Forsberg, Jonathan Joseph and Jamie Morgan for very useful com-
ments. The usual disclaimers apply.
2 The interview “Feynman on Social Science” is available for instance at https://vimeo.
com/118188988. See also (for instance) Tavares, 2014.
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more simple explanation: a category mistake. In society, laws do not exist as 
causal laws or empirical regularities. Laws are legislated, most typically in a par-
liament. Laws created in this way get actors to do things they would otherwise 
not do. This is a simplification of course, as laws may not be followed and they 
do not exhaust social rules; actions involve improvisations; and there are many 
kinds of relational elements and wholes in society. The real issue here concerns 
the existence of causal laws.
As there are no invariant law-like regularities in society, does that mean 
that there is no social causation either? Many anti- and post-positivists seem to 
have concluded that this is the case. For instance, in the long-standing debate 
about understanding versus explanation, the side of “understanding” has tried to 
avoid causal language (see Hollis, Smith, 1990; for a critique see Patomäki, 1996,
pp. 122–126). The avoidance of causal language is often taken to mean a focus 
on descriptive “how” instead of explanatory “why” questions, but also more ex-
treme positions have been common. Some post-positivists represent themselves 
as epistemological radicals, maintaining against “ontological mainstream” that 
there is no world “out there” (e.g. George, 1994). The implication seems to be 
that it is all “in here”, usually meaning that what exists is what is being thought, 
said or written about the world.
Contemporary social sciences include also realistic discussions about what 
exactly is constructed socially and whether social constructivism is compatible 
with causal-explanatory analysis (e.g. Searle, 1995; 2010; Hopf, 1998; Hacking, 
1999; Guzzini, 2000; 2017). What sometimes goes unnoticed in these discus-
sions is the implicit notion of causation and related scheme of explanations. So-
cial constructivism can be misleading to the extent that it fails to take clear dis-
tance from the notion of causation as invariant or law-like regularity. Herein lies 
a key contribution of critical realism (CR). Causation is about real powers and 
production of effects. CR explains society as an emergent layer of causally effica-
cious and open-systemic reality. In open systems the same or similar effects can 
be produced by many different causes; and the same causal powers and mecha-
nisms are capable of generating different effects in different contexts. Moreover, 
CR has also stressed that in a world in which (i) structures are action- and con-
cept-dependent, (ii) reasons can be causally efficacious, and (iii) rules and thus 
also laws can be changed; social sciences tend to have normative implications. 
Social sciences are routinely critical of existing realities.
I begin this article with a brief history of CR. Next I summarise CR ideas 
about emergence, open-systemic causation and the role of normative reason in 
human sciences. The apparent failure of social sciences to identify invariant causal
laws or empirical regularities stems from a misunderstanding about the nature 
of our object of study and the tasks of social sciences. However, also the scepti-
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cism and ontological super-idealism of radical post-positivism are unfounded. 
CR maintains that complex society is an emergent layer of reality. Not everything 
is socially constructed, not even in a highly reflexive complex society. Moreover, 
all layers of reality are causally efficacious and causation works also across layers.
The main original point of this paper is that the contributions of CR not-
withstanding, concepts such as emergence, causation and normativity are best 
understood as open sites for further conceptual and scientific developments. 
These concepts neither originate nor end in the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar 
(1944-2014) or anyone else. Understood as a progressive research programme, 
CR provides a plausible, rationally evolving framework for politics, political 
economy and other social sciences. Philosophy of social sciences should be seen 
as an open-ended process
A brief history of CR
Critical realism is often associated with the works of Bhaskar. Rom Harré was a con-
siderable influence on Bhaskar, whom Harré also supervised from 1970-1974. Al-
though their paths soon diverged, Bhaskar’s Realist Theory of Science (2008/1975) 
can also be seen, in important part, as a systematic articulation and further de-
velopment of Harré’s scientific realism. Harré had developed many of the notions 
which became central to scientific realism in the 1960s and 1970s (Harré, 1961, 
1970; Harré, Madden, 1975; Harré, Secord, 1976). But Harré did not work in a vac-
uum. Mary Hesse, Mario Bunge, Hilary Putnam and Stephen Toulmin are other 
important names involved in forging new realist ideas about science.
Bhaskar was also influenced by anti-monistic philosophers and sociologists 
of science, such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyera-
bend, who had signalled the corrigibility, historicity and relativity of knowledge. 
He also interpreted realist science in Marxian terms of production, adding a crit-
ical analysis of the connections between standard Western views of science, and 
the associated atomist or individualist sociology of action (not unlike the Frank-
furt School). After these and subsequent developments, the term “critical real-
ism” was coined in the late 1980s (also by Bhaskar himself, 1989, pp. 180–192). 
The term “critical” refers also to the Kantian legacy of critical philosophy and 
to the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, especially to the works of Theodor 
Adorno (see Norrie, 2004).
CR has been a collective endeavour involving several prime movers such as 
Margaret Archer, Bob Jessop, Tony Lawson and Andrew Sayer. The 1990s saw 
the establishment of the International Association for Critical Realism (IACR) 
and Journal of Critical Realism (at first known as Alethia). Meanwhile, Bhaskar 
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was working on his new turns. The dialectical turn comprises Dialectic: The 
Pulse of Freedom (1993) and its somewhat more accessible accompaniment, Pla-
to Etc: Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution (1994). These difficult and 
multifaceted works have been less influential than Bhaskar’s early works. The 
so called spiritual turn, first outlined in From East to West: Odyssey of a Soul 
(Bhaskar, 2000; for a global-political reading, Patomäki, 2003), became contro-
versial also among self-proclaimed critical realists. In the 2010s, most critical re-
alists continue to rely on a combination of scientific realism and critical theories.
 The key ideas of CR can be understood with the help of three philosophical 
theses: ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rational-
ism. Ontological realism means that the world is not only real but it must also be 
differentiated, structured, layered, open-systemic and possess causal powers for 
science and many other practices to be intelligible. All systems are open, but at the 
level of society also artificial closure is impossible. Society is emergent from na-
ture but, in part, qualitatively distinct from it. Social actors possess causal powers. 
Ontological realism forms the basis for our knowledge of the different aspects of 
the world, but this knowledge is always socially produced, contextual and fallible 
(epistemological relativism). This interpretative pluralism does not mean that all 
knowledge claims are equally valid. According to judgmental rationalism, we can 
always compare various interpretations, explanations and models to make well-
grounded and plausible judgements about their truth and other merits.
The role of Bhaskar as a guru of CR and his subsequent turns have less-
ened CR’s appeal in the neoliberalized academic world, quite independently of 
the validity of his and other critical realists’ claims (subjected to critical scruti-
ny in Patomäki, 2010). The current reward- and funding system supports meth-
od-driven empirical research and encourages theoretical fragmentation (Joseph, 
2014; Patomäki, 2016). Powerful interests favour neoclassical economics and ap-
proaches following the modelling approaches of rational choice theory, which 
are dominant in the US and many parts of Europe (see Patomäki, 2009). Success 
is not the same as good arguments.
Next I will summarise some of the main contributions of CR so far.
Emergence and layers of reality
New relations and things can emerge; a new combination and organisation of el-
ements may result in new properties and powers at the level of the whole. Brit-
ish emergentists developed these ideas already in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries (for a review and good discussion, see O’Connor, Wong, 
2015). The first emergentist was John Stuart Mill (1882, pp. 459–460), who ar-
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gued that the “phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of [in-
organic] parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which 
would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as 
mere physical agents”. In Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar adopts Mill’s argu-
ment and explicates it a bit further:
[T]he operations of the higher level cannot be accounted for solely by the laws go-
verning the lower order level in which we might say the higher-order level is ‘rooted’ 
and from which we might say it was ‘emergent’. […] Let us suppose that we could 
explain the emergence of organic life in terms of the physical and chemical elements 
out of which organic things were formed and perhaps even reproduce this process 
in the laboratory. Now would biologists lose their object of inquiry? Would living 
things cease to be real? Our apprehension of them unmasked as an illusion? No, for 
in as much as living things were capable of acting back on the materials out of which 
they were formed, biology would not be otiose. (Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 102–103)
Apart from emergence in nature, there is also emergence from nature. As dis-
cussed in The Possibility of Naturalism (Bhaskar, 1998/1979, especially pp. 41–
48), emergence from nature concerns the level of intentional action and society. 
Bhaskar argues that while the pre-existence of social forms are a necessary con-
dition for any intentional act, reasons for actions can and must be causes. The 
causal powers of mind are explained in terms of “synchronic emergent powers 
materialism”. The brain provides a basis, medium and vehicle of mental powers, 
but the powers of the human mind are not reducible to the brain. The properties 
and powers of the mind evolve in social contexts; and psychological states are re-
lational and make references to social states and structures. Social structures ex-
ist, however, in a different way than natural structures and mechanisms. Social 
structures are activity- and concept-dependent and are thus usually much less 
stable and enduring than natural structures. The tendencies generated by par-
ticular social structures are not invariant across time and space.
The standard CR account of emergence is based on the idea that there are 
only three main layers of reality: physical, biological and social (assuming that 
psychological is counted as part of the social level of reality). CR discussions 
about these levels are typically conceptual and philosophical rather than scien-
tific and historical. Both are needed. In fact, CR is supposed to be first and fore-
most an underlabourer of science. The history of cosmos, life and human species 
seems to involve many layers of emergence, up to thirteen “scales of combogen-
esis” (Volk, 2017; cf. Christian, 2018). A new level emerges when things and re-
lations at a prior level are combined and integrated, resulting in new things, rela-
tions and powers: from quarks to nuclei to atoms to molecules; from molecules 
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to prokaryotic cells to eukaryotic cells to multicellular organisms; and from an-
imal social groups to human tribal metagroups to agrovillages and to geopoliti-
cal states. The likely next layer is a qualitatively new social combination and in-
tegration on a planetary scale (Volk, 2017, pp. 195–199).
This seems like a comprehensive account, but there is nonetheless a lot of 
uncertainty about the order and timing of the emergence of language, reflective 
consciousness and complex society. Homo sapiens migrated from Africa to other 
parts of the world some 70,000 years ago and from that time onwards, some signs 
of cultural developments started to appear. For tens of thousands of years these 
developments were extremely slow and haphazard compared to the standards of 
the modern, industrialised world. Full language with complex rules of grammar 
must have existed by the time of the agricultural revolutions (“agrovillages”) and 
early civilisations, but it seems plausible that metaphorical language and reflec-
tive consciousness emerged much later. If, as Julian Jaynes (2000) claims, the ear-
ly empires were built by non-conscious bicameral minds, the emergence of social 
things and relations in the sense of CR social ontology would have occurred only 
as late as the first millennium BCE (however, for an alternative account of roughly 
the same change, see McGilchrist, 2012, pp. 260–266). Our social ontologies must 
be informed by our historical accounts of emergence.
Emergence of new things and relations occurs also within layers. New so-
cial relations and practices can emerge and through their combination and inte-
gration they also may give rise to emergent powers and properties. For example, 
my genealogy of the international problematic (Patomäki, 2002, ch. 1), is a par-
tial analysis of such emergence, focussing on the pre-conceptions of practices 
and the consequent problematic, but also discussing the emergent powers and 
properties of capitalist market society and modern states. It should be stressed 
that “the international system”, as distinct from states, is not a layer in any sense. 
Modern sovereign states and the European institutions of international (or in-
terstate) society emerged at the same time and have been co-constitutive. A re-
lated example is the emergence of rule of law during the 18th century European 
and American political revolutions.
Open-systemic causation
What must the world be like for laboratory experiments to make sense? Bhaskar’s 
answer in Realist Theory of Science and other works was that the scientists must 
be creating an artificial closure by their own labour and that a closure facilitates 
revealing the mechanisms of nature. The rationale for experiments is thus clear. 
Outside laboratory circumstances, causal effects are occurring only in open sys-
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tems, where strictly regular law-like conjunctions are difficult to find. Causal 
powers and mechanisms are transfactually efficacious across natural and social 
contexts, but their precise effects in open systems are always context-depend-
ent (being contingent upon what other forces and mechanisms are at play, etc.). 
Artificial closures are needed to study the effects of one mechanism at a time in 
a controlled manner.
In his early works, Bhaskar seems to have assumed that systems are either cat-
egorically closed or open. Event-regularities can occur only in closed systems. 
Gradually it became increasingly clear that all systems are open and closed to 
a degree. The openness of natural and/or social systems does not exclude the reg-
ularity of at least some things and connections. At this time, in the field of eco-
nomics, Tony Lawson (1997, pp. 204–213) introduced the concept of contrastive 
demi-regularity, indicating the existence of partial closures also in society. Con-
trastive demi-regularities are about contrasts between categories or spacetime ar-
eas and are expressed in terms of regularities within a given range of variation 
with certain probability. They are not strict but probabilistic regularities, limited 
to a particular spacetime area, and liable to change. The identification of demi-
regularities (or demi-regs) is not an aim in itself; rather, it is the task of social sci-
entists to move quickly from identifying them towards analysing the deeper so-
cial structures and causal complexes generating these manifest phenomena.
The critical realist conception of causation takes as its point of departure the 
idea that real causal powers produce effects in open systems. From this perspec-
tive, it is wrong to assume that causation can be analysed in terms of simply nec-
essary or sufficient conditions; yet this is presupposed if one talks about empiri-
cal invariances. The modified definition of cause as a so-called INUS-condition 
(see Bhaskar, 1998, pp. 142, 178 note 23; the concept is borrowed from Mackie, 
1974) resolves this aporia. Cause is an Insufficient but Non-redundant element 
of a complex which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the production of a re-
sult. One implication of the INUS-account is that a causal outcome depends on 
how different elements are organised and intra- and interact. Moreover, there are 
always many possible complexes capable of (co-)producing the same (or same 
kind of) outcome. In this conception causation should be understood not only 
in terms of complexes, but also in terms of the subject matter in question.
Critical reason and explanatory emancipation
The specific nature of social objects makes the task of social sciences distinct 
from the task of natural sciences. In addition to posing Kantian critical questions 
about the presuppositions of our knowledge, social sciences can and typically 
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must be critical of the existing social realities. This is because social actions and 
practices are meaningful. They are grounded on particular assumptions, under-
standing and claims about the world. Social sciences produce knowledge (SSK) 
that makes references to the knowledge circulated in practices (KoCiP). Typical-
ly what we have is:
SSK ≠ KoCiP → critique
If SSK is claimed to be valid, then KoCiP must be in some important regards 
false. This raises the question why KoCiP is being reproduced as part of certain 
structured activities and practices. If we have a theory that explains the circula-
tion and reproduction of KoCiP in knowledgeable practices, it appears that we 
should evaluate negatively also those structures, mechanisms and processes that 
co-explain the continuous reproduction of KoCiP. For instance, KoCiP may in-
volve rationalization and mystification of the existing reality or be illusionary for 
other reasons.
Bhaskar’s (1998, pp. 59–71) original scheme of explanatory emancipation, 
inspired by Karl Marx’s Capital, was based on a rather ambiguously formulated 
claim according to which no extraneous value is involved in making an inference 
from facts to negative evaluation of KoCiP. I have tried to show that in fact this 
inference relies on the positive value of truth and commitment to truth is a con-
dition of any discourse (Patomäki, 2002, ch. 5). This shifts the discussion to the 
meaning, nature and criteria of truth. Epistemological relativism, combined with 
a dialogical account of truth judgements, have manifold ethico-political impli-
cations, also regarding the scheme of explanatory emancipation. For instance, it 
must remain politically possible in the transformed context to persuade adher-
ents of SSK that it is in some ways false and should be replaced, at least in part, 
with better understandings, explanations and scenarios. This implies non-vio-
lence, need to cultivate pluralist public sphere, free arts and science, etc.
Moreover, while a society would of course be improved if its illusions, con-
tradictions, violence and injustices were reduced, do we know how this could 
be achieved? Mere negative criticism is not sufficient for concrete action. Criti-
cism presupposes the possibility of better practices and institutions (Sayer, 2000,
p. 161). In response to this line of thought, Bhaskar (1993; 1994) adopted the no-
tion “concrete utopia” from the Frankfurt School, defining it as a feasible and vi-
able alternative to the existing social realities. In his dialectical works, Bhaskar 
started to engage with ethical and political theory also more generally. As An-
drew Sayer (2011) argues, things matter to people, social sciences must be rele-
vant to human concerns, and thus the task of social sciences involves investigat-
ing and furthering the human good.
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Conclusions
The search for invariant causal laws in society is not futile because causation 
does not apply to society, but because the search is based on a misunderstand-
ing of social objects and causation. Causation is about real powers and the pro-
duction of outcomes in open systems. The early formulations of realist open-
systemic causation in society generated a new aporia, however. If causation is 
complex and open-systemic, and if there is a radical asymmetry between expla-
nation and prediction, it seems that there is little, if anything, that social sciences 
can say about the future. In a categorically open system everything must be un-
anticipatable: anything can happen at any moment. Yet it is a key point of both 
pragmatism and CR that adequate social science consists in our ability to act in, 
and shape, the world.
This has led to a reconceptualization of the openness of systems. Openness 
is a matter of degree rather than categorical. Structures and tendencies tend to 
endure and they can generate contrastive demi-regularities. Moreover, many so-
cial organisations have causal powers to arrange social activities in a manner that 
generates some closure and thus also regularity, predictability and control. These 
powers can be used for anything from coordination of actions to manipulation 
of subjects. This closure is not similar to the one achieved in laboratory experi-
ments, it is of a “spurious kind”, but nonetheless also implies some predictability, 
even though change is a constitutive characteristic of human societies. (Daner-
mark et al., 2002, p. 68 et passim).
If we know that something that we either seek, or strive to avoid, follows 
from something we can influence, then technical control or manipulation be-
comes possible. CR shares the half-a-century old insight of Jürgen Habermas 
(1972) that some technical knowledge is needed and that technical applicabili-
ty is one of the reasons why scientific information is valuable. But as Habermas 
underlined, technical interest may also serve non-generalizable particular inter-
ests such as money or power and may be unjustified for a variety of reasons. Fur-
ther problems for technical control are posed by the reflexivity of anticipations 
in economics, political economy and other social sciences. Predictions become 
easily self-altering. The realisation of this possibility opens up a new problem-
atic, which has been discussed in social sciences at least since Robert K. Merton 
(for a detailed exploration, see Patomäki, 2018). As can be seen, CR, like any phi-
losophy or theory of social science, is subject to the dialectical cycle of concep-
tual complexification as depicted in Figure 1 below.
CR is a moment in this process. The process of conceptual complexification 
is evident in the way the conceptions of emergence, causation and critical reason 
have evolved since the mid-19th century. I have tried to show that these three key 
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conceptions are open and evolving sites of discussions and developments. CR can 
itself be understood as a relatively enduring but transient conceptual structure that 
is dependent on our activities and collective learning. While we know that even 
better theories can emerge, at this point it is plausible to maintain that CR can pro-
vide a rationally evolving framework for politics, political economy and other so-
cial sciences in the 2020s and beyond. It is the best account of social sciences so far.
Figure 1: The dialectical cycle of conceptual complexification 
Source: Rescher, 2006, p. 84.
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